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SUPERIOR COURT OF SONOMA 




Cert to Cal. Supreme Ct. 
(Bird, Richardson, Clark, Manuel; 
Mosk, Tobriner, & Newman, 
dissenting) 
State/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr challenges the constitutionality of California's 
statutory-rape statute, which punishes as a felon any male who has sexual 
intercourse with a female under 18 years of age. 
--.....::__ 
2. FACTS: At the time of the alleg~d sexual liaison, petr Mic ha el 
M. was 17 years old and his partne r , Sharon, was 1 6 years old . Petr was 
1- char g e d a s a n adu l t with viol a t i ng Ca l ifornia Pe n a l Code § 261 . 5, which 
defines the o f f ens e o f " unlawf ul sexual i n t e rco u r s e " as "an a c t of sexual 
in t e rco urs e accompl i s hed with a f emale not t he wife of the perpetrator, 
1 dcm'f ~,·at ,,s IS WIV" lfM- fl.,wf:} '/11fA.1 ,. £I~ 
... ---' - -
- 2 -
~- where the female is under the age of 18 years." Petr sought a writ of 
prohibition from the California CA and, subsequently, from the California 
Supreme Ct., arguing that the statute's failure to apply to men and women 
equally violated his right to equal protection under the law. 
Cit 
~ .maj~rity of the California S. Ct. rejected petr's constitutional 
challenge. It conceded that, under its prior decisions, it was obligated 
to apply "strict scrutiny" to the classification established by§ 261.5, 
and that the state bore the burden of establishing "not only that the 
state has a compelling interest which justifies the law but that those 
distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further the statute's 
purposes." Citing Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal.3d 1, 16-17 (1971) 
(emphasis in original). According to the majority, however, § 261.5 was 
legitimately directed at the need to discourage and prevent pregnancies 
among unwed teenage girls. The majority pointed out that only the female 
participant in a sexual act can become pregnant and that the severe 
consequences of extramarital teenage pregnancies fell more heavily upon 
females than upon males. It rejected petr's contention that§ 261.5 
failed to serve the suggested purpose because it applied even to those 
sexual acts where pregnancy had been rendered impossible through use of 
contraceptives. According to the majority, the legislature -was entitled 
to reject a distinction that turned upon "'the doubtful efficacy of 
contraceptives and the truth of the inevitable claim of nonemission by a 
male charged with statutory rape.'" Quoting State v. Rundlett, 391 A.2d 
815, 821 n. 18 (Me. 1978). The majority also concluded that§ 261.5 was 
not unconstitutionally underinclusive because it failed to hold women 
(- equally culpable for sexual acts with • males under the age of 18. The 
court pointed out that all minors, male and female, were protected by 






the delinquency of minors and lewd and lascivious conduct wi t h minors. 
This fact allegedly distinguishe d the California statute from that struck 
down in Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602 (1st Cir. 1977}, cert. denied, 
436 U.S. 950 (1978}, where New Hampshire failed to make it a crime of any 
kind . for~ woman to have consentual sexual relations with a male under 
the statutory age of consent. According to the majority, § 261.5 "merely 
provides additional protection for minor females in recognition of the 
demonstrably greater injury, physical and emotional, which they may 
suffer. 
Judge Mosk, writing for the dissenters, disputed the majority's 
conclusion that§ 261.5 was intended to discourage or prevent 
extramarital teenage pregnancies. According to the dissent, the evidence 
was overwhelming that the statute in question was originally intended t o 
protect ''the virtue of young and uns ophisticated girls." Given such a 
purpose, the dissenters believed that§ 261.5 represented an 
unconstitutional stereotype. Even if the statute were enacted for the 
purpose of preventing teenage pregnancies, the dissenters believed t ha t 
it was both overinclusive in proscribing those sexual acts wher e 
pregnancy was an impossibility and underinclusive in failing to recog n ize 
that both participants in the sexual act could be equally culpable . 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that the statute in question viola t es 
this Court's pronouncements on gende r-based discrimination. In 
particular, he cites Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 282-283 (1979}, wh e re this 
Court stated that "a gende r -based class r fication which, as compa r ed t o a 
gender-neutral one, generat e s additional be nefit s only for thos e it has 
• no r e a s o n to prefer c a nnot sur v ive equal protectio n s c rutiny. " He also 
poin ts out th e frequ e ncy wi th which challenges to similar sta tu tes have 
a r i se n in the l o wer courts. See Rund l ett v . Oliver, 607 F . 2d 492 
... 





(CA 1 1979); Meloon v. Helgemoe, supr a ; Olson v. Nevada, 588 P.2d 1018 
(1979); State v. Drake, 219 N.W.2d 492 (Iowa 1974); People v. Fauntleroy, 
405 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1978); Ex Parte Groves, 571 S.W.2d 888 (Texas 1978); 
State v. Rundlett, supra; State v. Thompson, 392 A.2d 678 (N.J. 1978); 
State v. Meloon, 366 A.2d 1176 (N.H. 1976); In re Interest of J. D. G., 
4 9 8 s • w. 2 d 7 8 6 ( Mo . 19 7 3 ) • 
4. DISCUSSION: Of all the cases cited above, only Meloon v. 
Helgemoe, supra, resulted in the invalidation of a statutory rape 
statute. Helgemoe, moreover, would seem to have been severely limited by 
Rundlett v. Oliver, supra, where the CA 1 upheld Maine's statutory rape 
provision because, unlike New Hampshire, that state had enacted its 
statutory rape provision for the right reasons. 
Perhaps the Court should call for a response. 
4/7/80 
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- No. 79-1344: Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County 
-
Question Presented 
Does California Penal Code§ 261.5, which holds only 
males criminally culpable for "unlawful sexual intercourse," 
violate the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating on the 
basis of sex? 
Background 
Petitioner Michael M. is charged by information with 
violating California Penal Code§ 261.5, which reads: 
Unlawful sexual intercourse is an act of 
sexual intercourse accomplished with a 
female not the wife of the perpetrator, 
where the female is under the age of 18 
years· .. !/ 
Evidence adduced at petition er' s arraignment shows that 
-
-
- - 2. 
petitioner and the prosecutrix, Sharon, engaged in sexual 
intercourse sometime after midnight on June 3, 1978. Petitioner 
was 1 7 years old; Sharon was 1 6 years old. They had met each 
other for the first time at approximately midnight as Michael 
and two male friends rode bicycles past a bus stop at which 
Sharon and her older sister were sitting and drinking whiskey. 
At the boy's invitation, the girls joined them in drinking wine. 
After the others had departed, petition er and Sharon proceeded 
to a park and engaged in hugging and kissing which eventually 
led to Michael's request that Sharon remove her pants. 
initially refused, and Michael struck her in the face. 
then acquiesced to sexual intercourse. 
Sharon 
Sharon 
Petitioner moved at his arraignment to set aside the 
information on the ground that § 261.5 violates the Equal 
Protection Clause by holding only males criminally culpable for 
unlawful sexual intercourse. 
motion, petitioner sought 
California Court of Appeals. 
After the trial court denied the 
a writ of prohibition in the 
After that court denied the writ, 
petitioner appealed to the California Supreme Court. 
By a 4-3 vote, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial 
of the writ. The majority (Richardson, J., with The Chief 
Justice and Justice Clark and Manuel joining) conceded that § 
261.5 discriminates on the basis of sex because only females may 
be victims and only males may be offenders. Accordingly, the 




- - 3. 
5 Cal.3d 1 (1971), to invalidate§ 261.5 unless the State showed 
"not only that the state has a compelling interest which 
justifies the law but that those distinctions drawn by the law 
are necessary to further the statute's purposes." Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari (hereinafter "Petn"), at A-2 (emphasis 
original). The majority found the classification by sex 
"readily justified," however, by the state interest II in .. 
minimizing both the number of [teenage] pregnancies and their 
disastrous consequences." Petn, at A-3. Given this state 
interest, the majority continued, "[t] he Legislature is well 







alone, because they are the only persons who may physiologically ~ 
cause the result which the law properly seeks to avoid." Petn, -~ 
at A-5 (emphasis original). 
The majority also found that the distinction drawn b~ V~ 
the statute is sufficiently related to the legislative purpose 
of preventing teenage pregnancies and their personal and social 
costs. Thus, in response to petitioner's argument that§ 261.5 
is over-inclusive because it applies to males who use 
contraceptives or who for some reason are incapable of 
impregnating, the majority adopted the reasoning of the Supreme 
Judicial Council of Maine, State v. Rundlett, 391 A.2d 815 
( 1978), that legislators reasonably could decide not to rely 
upon contraceptives or the likelihood of their use by teenagers 
to effectuate the goal of preventing teenage pregnancies. The 
-
-
- - 4. 
majority also noted that legislators reasonably could seek to 
avoid the evidentiary problems which inevitably arise if alleged 
offenders can assert as a defense that they had used a 
contraceptive. In response to petitioner's argument that § 
261 • 5 is under-inclusive because only males are off enders even 
though females in some instances may be the more sexually 
aggressive party, the majority made two observations. First, 
the majority held that the Legislature may "recognize degrees of 
culpability." Petn, at A-6. From this, the majority held that 
the Legislature reasonably could conclude that males require the 
deterence which the law provides, whereas females are deterred 
naturally by the risk of pregnancy and its consequences. 
Second, the majority held that the Legislature reasonably could 
decide that, as a practical matter, prose cut ion under § 261 . 5 
would be impossible if the prosecutrix herself were 
prosecutable. In sum, the majority concluded that an important 
state interest supports § 261. 5 and that the distinction drawn 
in § 261. 5 substantially relates to the achievement of that 
interest. 
~ 
The dissent (Mosk, J., with Justices Tobriner and ~ 
Newman joining) disputed the majority's conclusion both as to 
legislative purpose and as to relationship of means to purpose. 
First, the dissent noted that the majority cited no authority 
for its holding that the prevention of teenage pregnancies is 




- - 5. 
the history of statutory rape laws, the language of§ 261.5, and 
that court's own prior statements of the purpose of the 
predecessor statutes to§ 261.5, the dissent concluded that "it 
is wishful thinking to believe that the California statutory 
rape law was actually enacted or reenacted for the purpose" of 
preventing teenage pregnancies. Petn, at A-17. The dissent 
concluded, rather, that the legislative purpose was to protect 
minor females' virtue from their presumed inability to protect 
themselves from sexual advances or to consent intelligently to 
sexual rel at ions. In the dissent's view, that purpose cannot 
support § 261 • 5 because it rests on anachronistic and 
stereotypic assumptions about women. Assuming arguendo that 
prevention of pregnancy is the legislative purpose, the dissent 
concluded that§ 261.5 is both under- and over-inclusive for the 
reasons petitioner advanced. 
Petitioner and 
Contentions 
respondent agree that § 261 • 5 
establishes a classification expressly discriminating against 
men and, therefore, that the classification "must serve 
important governmental objectives and must be substantially 
related to achievement of those objectives." 
V 
Orr v. Orr, 4 40 
U.S. 268, 279 (1979); Califano v. Webster 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 
(1977). Petitioner and respondent disagree on the governmental 
objective that § 261.5 is meant to serve. If respondent 




- - 6. 
261.5 is not substantially related the objective of preventing 
teenage pregnancies and their costs. 
(1) The Objective Behind§ 261.5. 
Petitioner contends that "'inquiry into the actual 
purposes' of the discrimination," Califano · v; · Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 
199, 212-13 (1977)(quoting Weinberger- · v~ ·- wie~enfeld, 420 U.S. 
636, 648 (1975), will reveal that the prevention of teenage 
pregnancies is not the legislative purpose behind § 261.5. 
Rather, petitioner contends, the history of statutory-rape laws 
and the prior statements of the California Supreme Court show 
that § 261.5 is meant to protect young females from their own 
presumed naivety and inability to decide intelligently about 
sexual relations. Petitioner urges the Court to recognize that 
this presumption perpetuates a stereotype about women which the 
Court's precedent render insufficient to warrant the 
discrimination. See, ~, Orr v; ·· orr, 440 u.s. 268, 283 
( 1 9 7 9 ) , S tan ton - v . ·· S tan ton , 4 21 U • S • 7 , 1 0 ( 1 9 7 5 ) , S ch 1 es in g er 
v; -- Ba 11 a rd, 4 1 9 U. s. 4 9 8 ( 1 9 7 5 ) • In sum, petitioner contends 
that the California Supreme Court seized upon prevention of 
pregnancy as "an available hindsight catchall rationalization -
for laws that were promulgated with totally different purposes 
in mind." ~ loon · v~ Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602, 607 (1st Cir. 
1977)(invalidating New Hampshire's statutory-rape law as 
violative of equal protection). 








conclusion that ~ 
prevention of teenage pregnancies and the attendant social and W 
as dispositive the California Supreme Court's 
personal costs is the legislative purpose behind § 261. 5. ~ 
Respondent relies on Weinberger v. Wiesen~eld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 
n.16 (1975), for the proposition that this Court should defer to 
the highest state court's explanation of legislative purpose 
unless "an examination of the legislative scheme and its history 
demonstrates that the asserted purpose coµld not have been a 
goal of the legislation" (emphasis added). Respondent then 
suggests four reasons why such an examination does not show that 
prevention of teenage pregnancies could not have been the 
legislative purpose. First, respondent asserts that no weight 
should be given to the prior statements of the California 
Supreme Court about the purpose of the statutory rape law 
uL, 
because none of those statements ~ supported by citation to 
I\ 
actual legislative history. Second, respondent asserts that the 
Legislature might have been concerned about teenage pregnancy 
when in 1970 it recodified the statutory rape law into§ 261.5's 
offense of "unlawful sexual intercourse. ~ respondent 
asserts that the Legislature ratified the California Supreme 
Court's decision as to§ 261.5's purpose by failing, after that 
decision, to pass two proposed bills to render § 261. 5 gender-
neutral. c::5- respondent asserts that the -.:,_alifornia 








- - 8. 
concern about teenage pregnancies and their consequences. 
Acting as amicus, the Solicitor General supports SG---- of teenage ~ respondent's 
pregnancies 
contention that the prevention 
is the legislative purpose behind § 
p,I_ ~ 
261.5. In ·~ 
addition to the arguments made by respondent, the Solicitor ----General contends that the language of § 261. 5 is inconsistent 
witn petitiooer's argument that preservation of female chastity ? 
and protection of female naivety were the legislative purposes 
behind that section. If these were the purposes, the Solicitor 
~
argues, then§ 261.5 would allow the male to assert in defense 
that the female was neither chaste nor naive. 
[The Solicitor 
legislative purposes behind 
protection to young girls 
also suggests 
§ 261 . 5 were to 
from sexual risks 
that additional .:5 ~~ J-:-. l.,,,,,,_,~ 
provide spec1a ~~
and to aid the ~ 
prosecution of forcible-rape charges involving young female 
victims. Although these are plausible purposes behind a statute 
like§ 261.5, they were not identified by the California Supreme 
Court as purposes actually behind § 261. 5. Therefore, these 
purposes do not avail respondent in light of this Court's 
intimation that it insists upon knowing the actual legislative 
purpose when reviewing gender-based statutes. 
429 U.S. 190, 200 n.7 (1976).] 
(2) Relation to Legislative Purpose 
Craig v. Boren, 
Petitioner contends that§ 261.5 is not substantially 
related to the objective of preventing teenage pregnancies 
-
-
- - 9. 
because it is both under- and over-inclusive. First, the 
statute is under-inclusive in petitioner's view because it holds 
only males culpable for pregnancies despite the fact that in 
some instances the female will have been the more sexually 
aggressive. Sex, petitioner contends, is an inaccurate proxy 
for blame, and § 261. 5 therefore is unconstitutionally 
arbitrary. Petitioner relies on Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 
(1971), for the proposition that such an arbitrary use of sex 
violates the Equal Protection Clause. Second, the statute is 
over-inclusive in petitioner's view because it holds the male 
culpable even if pregnancy is unlikely because of contraceptive 
use or impossible because of sterility. 
Respondent and the Solicitor General concede that the 
relation between statutory objective and means is imperfect, but -
they contend that the under- and over-inclusiveness f § 261. 5 
is permissible. 
~
The statute is not impermissibly under-
inclusive, in their view, because the Legislature reasonably 
could decide that it needed to deter only males, who lack the 
natural deterence that the risk of pregnancy poses to females. 
The statute is not impermissibly over-inclusive, in their view, 
because the Legislature reasonably could decide that defenses 
based upon purported sterility or contraceptive use present 
evidentiary problems which would hinder enforcement of the 
statute. They also contend that holding females culpable would 
- impair enforcement by inhibiting females from complaining. 
-
- - 1 0. 
Furthermore, both respondent and the Solicitor General contend 
that petitioner lacks standing to raise claims of under- and 
over-inclusiveness. They contend that petitioner cannot 
complain of under-inclusiveness because his use of force against 
Sharon suggests that he in fact was more culpable. They contend 
that petitioner cannot complain of over-inclusiveness because he 
has never asserted that he in fact used a contraceptive. 
Analysis 
I am inclined to conclude that § 261.5 violates the 
Equal Protection Clause. Because I reach that conclusion even 
after accepting a~guendo the California Supreme Court's 
- conclusion that the legislative purpose behind § 261. 5 is to 
prevent pregnancy and its consequences, I proceed immediately to 
the question whether the gender classification in § 261. 5 is 
~ 
-
substantially related to achieving that purpose. I believe that 
this question is controlled by the Court's prior decisions 
involving gender-based statutes. Specifically, I rely on Craig 
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), and Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 
(1979). 
Craig raised the question whether the Equal Protection 
Clause barred an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of 3.2% 
beer to males under 21 years and to females under 1 8 years 
violated. The Court stated: 
Reed v. Reed [404 U.S. 71 (1971 )] has 
also provided the underpinning for decisions 








gender as an inaccurate proxy for other, 
more germane bases of classification •••• In 
light of the weak congruence between gender 
and the characteristic or trait that gender 
purported to represent, it was necessary 
that the legislatures choose either to 
realign their substantive laws in a gender-
neutral fashion, or to adopt procedures for 
identifying those instances where the sex-
centered generalization actually comported 
with fact. 
11. 
In the case now before the Court, gender is an 
inaccurate proxy for a more germane basis of classification, 
which is culpability in engaging in sexual intercourse and 
causing pregnancy. Gender is inaccurate because females are as 
capable of causing the sexual intercourse as males. Doubtless 
in some instances, the female will be more responsible than the 
male for intercourse having occurred. [That gender is an 
incorrect proxy does not mean, however, that the State cannot 
bar sexual intercourse between a person over the age of majority 
and a person under the age of majority, for nothing bars the use 
of age as a proxy for culpability, even though in some cases the 
result will seem arbitrary.] 
Orr raised the question whether the Equal Protection 
Clause barred an Alabama statute under which ex-husbands but not 
ex-wives may be required to pay alimony. In response to the 
State's assertion that its purpose was to provid financial help 
to needy spouses, 
classification was 
the Court noted that the gender-based 
fullfiling such 
State] were to 





be hampered ... 





- - 12. 
burdens independent of sex." 
the Court held: 
440 U.S. at 282. Additionally, 
Legislative classifications which distribute 
benefits and burdens on the basis of gender 
carry the inherent risk of reinforcing 
stereotypes about the 'proper place' of 
women and their need for special protection. 
••• Where, as here, the State's compensatory 
and ameliorative purposes are as well served 
by a gender-neutral class if icai ton as one 
that gender classifies and therefore carries 
with it the baggage of sexual stereotypes, 
the State cannot be permitted to classify on 
the basis of sex. 
In the case now before the Court, the gender classification 
similarly 
preventing 
is gratuitous. The State can serve its purpose of 
teenage pregnancies and their consequences as well, 
- or perhaps better, though a statute that does not classify 
offender and victim by gender. 
-
Respondent makes two arguments to rebut Craig and £IE· 
First, respondent argues that, as a general matter, young males 
are less likely than young females to take seriously the risk of 
pregnancy. Therefore, respondent contends, gender is an 
accurate proxy for culpability in causing sexual intercourse and 
pregnancy. I might be persuaded by this argument if this case 
were the first gender-discrimination case to reach this Court, 
for commonsense about the way of the teenage world suggests that 
respondent's generalization is accurate. But the Court's 
precedents have held this type of generalization is insufficient 
to support a classification by gender. See Craig v. Boren, 429 







- - 1 3. 
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 13 (1975). In sum, there is 
only a "weak congruence" between being male and being culpable 
for engaging in sexual intercourse and causing pregnancy. 
Second, respondent argues that petition er lacks 
standing to complain that § 261.5 presumptively holds the male 
culpable when in some instances the female will be more 
culpable. Petitioner lacks standing, in respondent's view, 
because the evidence suggests that in this case petitioner is 
the more culpable because he physically obtained Sharon's 
acquiesence. This argument is unpersuasive, for force is not an 
element of the offense. Accordingly, petitioner would be in the 
same position if Sharon had acquiesced voluntarily. 
Petitioner's use of force is beside the point, and it does not 
deprive h i m of standing to attack § 261. 5 on its face and as 
applied. [Petitioner's standing to attack the under-
inclusiveness of § 261.5 is established by Craig v. Boren, 429 
U.S. at 196.] 
that § 
Conclusion 
In light of the precedents of this Court, I conclude 
261.5 violates the Equal Protection Clause and, 
accordingly, that the judgment of the California Supreme Court 








l/ Section 264 makes unlawful sexual intercourse 
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JusTICE REHNQUIST delivered· the opinion of the Court. / ~ ~., ~ 11 ... ~ , 
The question presented in this case is whether California';"~ I 
"statutory rape" law, § 261.5 of the California Penal Code, j 
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth ~ 
Amendment. Section 261.5 defines unlawful sexual inter-,4 ~
course as "an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a 
female not the wife of the perpetrator, where the female is~ _ ;1 
under the age of 18 years." The statute thus makes men U. • ., 
alone criminally liable for the act of sexual intercourse. r ~ , 
In July 1978, a complaint was filed in the Municipal Court J2,u__ ,,.L, b 11 ~ , 
of Sonoma County, Cal., alleging that petitioner, then a ~
17½ year old male, had had unlawful sexual intercourse with t1,l.., UAA _ 3 ~'f-a female under the age of 18, in violation of § 261.5. The ,-r-- ..,_-
evidence adduced at a preliminary hearing showed that at ~ 
approximately midnight on June 3, 1978, petitioner and two ~ 
friends approached Sharon, a 16½ year old female, and her· ./~ _
1 
~ ✓• ~ _ ~ 
sister as they waited at a bus stop. Pet:tioner and Sharon, ~ 
who had already been drinking, moved away from the others·  
and began to kiss. After being struck in the face for re- / · -~• .... 0 
buffing petitioner's initial advances, Sharon submitted t~ 
sexual intercourse with petitioner. Prior to trial, petitioner 
sought to set aside the information on both state and federal~ k-
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criminated on the basis of gender. The trial court and the 
California Court of Appeal denied petitioner's request for re-
lief and petitioner sought review in the Supreme Court of 
California. 
The Supreme Court held that "Section 261.5 discriminates 
on the basis of sex because only females may be victims, and 
only males may violate the section." · The court then sub-
jected the cla.ss:fication to "strict scrutiny," stating that it 
must be justified by a compelling state interest. It found 
that the classification was "supported not by mere social 
convention but by the immutable physiological fact that it is 
the female exclusively who can become pregnant:" Can-
vassing "the tragic human cost of illegitimate teenage preg-
nancies," including the large number of teenage abortions, the 
increased medical risk associated with teenage pregnancies, 
and the social consequences of teenage child bearing, the 
court concluded that the state has a compelling interest in 
preventing such pregnancies. Because males alone can 
"physiologically cause the result which the law properly seeks 
to avoid" the court further held that the gender classification 
was readily justified as a means of identifying offender and 
victim. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment 
of the California Supreme Court.1 
1 The lower federal courts and state courts have almost uniformly con-
cluded that sta tutory rape laws are constitutional See, e. g., Rund-
lett v. Oliver, 607 F . 2d 495 (CAI 1979) ; Hall v. McKenzie, 537 F . 2d 
1232 (CA4 1976) ; Hall v. State, 365 So. 2d 1249, 1252-1253 (Ala. Crim 
App. 1978), cert. denied, 365 So. 2d 1253 (1979); State v. Gray, 122 Ariz . 
445, 595 P . 2d 990, 991-992 (1979); People v. Mackey, 46 Cal. App. 3d 
755, 760-761, 120 Cal. Rptr. 157, 160, cert. denied, 423 U. S. 951 (1975) ; 
People v. Salinas, 191 Colo. 171, 551 P. 2d 703 (1976) ; State v. Brothers, 
384 A 2d 402 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978) ; In re W. E . P., 318 A. 2d 286 , 289-
290 (DC 1974) ; Barnes v. State, 244 Ga. 302, 303-304, 260 S. E. 2d 40, 
41-42 (1979), State v. Drake, 219 N . W. 2d 492, 495-496 (Iowa 1974) ; 
State v. Bell, 377 So. 2d 303 (La. 1979) ; State v. Rundlett, 391 A. 2d 
815 (Me. 1978) ; Green v. State, 270 So. 2d 695 (Miss. 1972) ; In re 
J. D. G., 498 S. W. 2d 786, 792-793 (Mo. 1973) ; State v. Meloan, 116i 
- -
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As is evident from our opinions, the Court has had some 
difficulty in agreeing upon the proper approach and analysis 
in cases involving challenges to gender-based classifications. 
The issues posed by such challenges range from issues of 
standing, see Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) , to the appro-
priate standard of judicial review for the substantive classi-
fication. Unlike the California Supreme Court, we have not 
held that gender-based classifications are "inherently suspect" 
and thus we do not apply so-called "scrict scrutiny" to those 
classifications. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U. S. 7 (1975) . 
Our cases have held, however, that the traditional minimum 
rationality test takes on a somewhat ''sharper focus" when 
gender-based classifications are challenged. See Craig v. 
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.* (1976) (POWELL, J., concurring). 
In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) , for example, the Court 
stated that a gender-based classincation will be upheld if it 
bears a "fair and substantial relationship" to legitimate state 
ends, while in Craig v. Boren, supra, at 197, the Court restated 
the t2st to require the classification to bear a "substantial 
relationship" to " important governmental object=ves. '' 
Underlying these decisions is the principle that a legis-
lature may not "make overbroad generalizations based on s,3x 
which are entirely unrelated to any differences between men 
and women or which demean the ability or social status of 
N. H. 669, 366 A. 2d 1176 (1976) ; State v. Thompson, 162 N. J . Super. 
302, 392 A. 2d 678 (1978) ; People v. Mndange-Pfupfu, 411 N. Y. S. 2d 
1000, 97 Misc. 2d 496 (1978) : State v. W ilson, 296 N. C. 298, 311-313, 
250 S. E . 2d 621, 629- 630 (1979) ; Olson v. State, 588 P. 2d 1018 (Nev. 
1979) ; State v. Elmore, 24 Ore. App. 651 , 546 P. 2d 1117 (1976) ; Roe v. 
State, 584 S. W. 2d 257, 259 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979) ; Ex parte Groves, 
571 S. W. 2d 888, 892- 893 (Tex Crim. App. 1978); Moore v. M cK enzie, 
236 S. E. 2d 342-343 (W. Va. 1977) ; Flores v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 509, 
510-511 , 230 N. W. 2d 637, 638 (1975 ). Contra, United States v. Hicks, 
625 F . 2d 216 (CA9 1980) , Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564 F . 2d 602 (CA1 
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the affected class." Parhani v. Hughes, 441 U. S. 347, 354 
(1979) (STEWART, J. plurality). But because the Equal Pro-
tection Clause does not "demand that a statute apply equally 
to all persons" or require "things which are different in 
fact ... to be treated in law as though they were the same," 
Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U. S. 305, 309 (1966), this Court has 
consistently upheld statutes where the gender classification 
is not invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that 
the sexes are not similarly situated in certain circumstances. 
Parham v. Hughes, supra; Califano v. Webster, 430 U. S. 313 
(1977); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498 (1975); Kahn 
v. Shevin, 416 U. S. 351 (1974). As the Court has stated, a 
legislature may "provide for the special problems of \\'Omen.'' 
Weinberger v. Wiesenfcld, 420 U. S. 63(}, 653 (1975) . 
Applying those principles to this case, the fact that the 
California Legislature criminalized the act of illicit sexual 
intercourse with a minor female is a sure indication of it 
or ur ose to discourage that conduct.2 This Court 
has long recognized t at rnqumes into congressional motives 
or purposes are a hazardous matter," United States v. O'Brien, 
391 U. S. 367, 383-384 (1968); Palmer v. Thompson, 420 
U. S. 217. 224 (1970), and the search for the "actual" or 
"primary" purpose of a statute is likely to be elusive. Arling-
ton Heights v. Nletropolitan Housing Corp. 429 U. S. 252, 
265 (1977); McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U. S. 263, 276-277 
(1973) . Here, for example, the individual legislators may 
have voted for the statute for a variety of reasons. Some 
legislators may have been concerned about preventing teenage 
pregnancies. others about protecting young females from 
physical injury or from the loss of "chastity," and still others 
about promoting various religious and moral attitudes towards 
premarital sex. 
2 The statute was enacted as part of California's first penal code in 1851), 
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J r The justification for the statute offered by the State, and 
accepted by the Supreme Court of California, is that the leg-
islature sought to prevent illegitimate teenage pregnancies. 
That finding, of course, is entitled to great deference. Reit-
man v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373--374 (1967). And although 
our cases establish that the State's asserted reason for the 
enactment of a statute may be rejected, "if it could not have 
been a goal of the legislation," Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 
supra, at 648, n. 16, this is not such a case. 
We are satisfied not only that the prevention of illegitimate 
pregnancy js at least one of the "purposes" of the statute, 
but that the State has a strong interest in preventing such 
pregnancy. At the risk of stating the obvious, illegitimate 
pregnancies, which have increased dramatically over the last 
two decades,3 pose enormous problems for the mother, the 
child, and the State. The social, economic and medical con-
sequences associated with teenage childbearing are far-reach-
ing.4 The mother's "probable education, employment skills, 
[and] :financial resources," for example, make illegitimate 
pregnancy exceptionally burdensome for both mother and 
State. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, 642 (1979) (POWELL, 
s In 1976 approximately one million 15-19 year olds became pregnant, 
one-tenth of all women in that age group. Two-thirds of the pregnancies 
were illegitimate. Illegitimacy rates for teenagers (births per 1,000 un-
married females ages) increased 75% for 14-17 year olds between 1961 
and 1974 and 33% for 18-19 yea.r olds. Alan Guttma,cher Institute, 11 
:rviillion Teenagers 10, 13 (1976); C. Chilman, Adolescent Sexuality In A 
Changing American Society, 195 (NIH Pub. No. 80-1426, 1980) . 
4 The risk of maternal death i8 60% higher for a teenager under the 
age of 15 than for a women in her early twenties. The risk is 13% higher 
for 15-19 year olds. The statistics further :;how tha.t teenage mothers 
are more likely to drop out of school and face bleak futures of unemploy-
ment. See e. g., 11 Million Teenagers, supra, at 23 , 25 ; Bennett & Bar-
don, The Effects of a School Program On Teenager Mother And Their 
Children, 47 Am. J. of Orthopsychiatry 671 (1977); Phipps-Yonas, Teen-
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J.). Of particular concern to the State is that approximately 
half of all teenage pregnancies end in abortion.5 And of those 
children who are born, their illegitimacy makes them likely 
candidates to become wards of the State.6 
We need not be medical doctors to discern that young men 
and young women are not similarly situated with respect to 
the problems and the risks of sexual intercourse. Only 
women may become pregnant and they can not escape the 
profound physical, emotional, and psychological consequences 
of sexual activity as readily as can men. · The statute at 
issue here protects women from sexual intercourse at an age 
when those consequences are particularly severe.7 
5 This is because teenagers are disproportionately likely to seek abortions. 
Center for Disease Control, Abortion Surveillance 1976, 22-24 (1978) . 
In 1978, for example, teenagers in California had approximately 54,000 
abortions and 53,800 live births. California Center for Health Statistics, 
Reproductive Health Status of California Teenage Women 1, 23 (1980) . 
6 The policy and intent of the California Legislature evinced in other 
legislation buttresses our view that the prevention of teenage pregnancy 
is a purpose of the statute. The preamble to the "Maternity Care for 
Minors Act," for example, states "The legislature recognizes tha.t pregnancy 
among unmarried persons under 21 years of age constitutes an increasing 
social problem in California." Cal. Welfare & lniit. Code § 16145 (West 
Supp. 1979) . 
Subsequent to the decision below, the California LegislaJure considered 
and rejected proposals to render § 261.5 gender neutral, thereby ratify-
ing t.Irn judgment of the California Supreme Court. Tha.t is enough 
to answer petitioner's contention that the statute was the "accidental by 
product- of a traditional way of thinking about women." Califanio v. 
Webstei·, 430 U. S. 313, 320 (1977) (quoting Califmw v. Goldfarb, 430 
U. S. 199, 223 (1977) (STEVENS, J ., concurring)). Certainly this de-
cision of the California Legislature is as good a source as is this Court in 
deciding what is "current" and what is "outmoded" in the perception 
of women. 
7 Although petitioner concedes that the State has a "compelling" inter-
est in preventing teenage pregnancy, he contends that the "true" purpose 
of § 261.5 is to protect the virture and chastity of young women. As such, 
the statute-is unjustifiable because it rests on archaic sterotypes. What we 
- -
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The question thus boils down to whether a State may 
attack the problem of sexual intercourse and teenage preg-
nancy directly by prohibiting a male from having sexual inter-
course with a minor female. 8 We hold that such a statute is 
have said above is enough to dispose of that contention. The question for 
us-and the only question under the Federal Constitutjon-is whether the 
legislation violates the Equal Prote.otion Clause of the Fourtemth Amend-
ment, not whether its supporters ma,y have endorsed it for reasons no longer 
generally accepted. Even if the preservat.ion of female chasity were one 
of the motives of the statute, and even if that motive be impermissible, 
petitioner's argument must fail because "it io a familiar practice of 
constitutional law that this court will not strike down an otherwise 
constitutional statute on the basi::; of an alleged illicit legislative motive." 
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 383 (1968) . In Orr v. Orr, 
440 U.S. 268 (1!}79), for example, the Court rejected one asserted purpo,;e 
as impermissible, but then considered other purposes to determine if they 
could justify the statute. Similarly, in Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 
229, 243 (1976) the Court distingui,;hed Palmer v. Thompson, 420 U. S. 
217 (1970), on the groW1ds that the purpo:;es of the ordinance there were 
not open to impeachment by evidence that the legislature was actually 
motivated by an impermissible purpose. See also Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U. S. 263, 270, n. 21 (1976) ; Mobile 
v. Bolden, 466 U. S. 55, 91 (1980) (STEVENS, J., concurring) . 
8 We do not understand petitioner to question a. state's authority to 
make sexual intercour,;e among teenagers a. crilninal act, at least on t1, 
gender-neutral basis. In Carey v. Population Services International, 431 
U.S. 678, 694, n. 17 (1977) (BRENNAN, J., plurality), four Members of 
the Court assumed for the purposes of that case that a State may regu-
late the sexual behavior of minors, while four other Members of the 
Court more emphatically stated that such regulation would be permissible. 
Id ., at 702, 703 (WHITE, J., concurring); Id., at. 705-707, 709 (PowBLL, 
J., concurring) ; Id., at 13 (STEVENS, J., concurring) ; Id ., at 718, (REHN-. 
QUIST, J ., dissenting). The Court has long recognized that a State has even 
broader authority to protect the physical, mental, and moral well-being of its 
youth, than of its adults. See, e. g., Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. 
Danforth., 428 U. S. 52, 72-74 (1976), Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U. S. 
629, 639-640 (1968) ; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 170 (1944) . 
As JUSTICE POWELL stated in Bellotti v. Baird, 433 U. S. 622, 635 (1979) 
"states may validly limit the freedom of children to choose for themselves 
in the making of important, affirmative choices with potentially serioi.le 
- -
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sufficiently related to the State's objectives to pass constitu~ 
tional muster. 
Because virtually all of the significant harmful and inescap-
ably identifiable cqnsequences of teenage pregnancy fall on 
the young female, a legislature acts well within its authority 
when it elects to punish only the participant who, by nature, 
suffers few of the consequences of his conduct. It is hardly 
unreasonable for a legislature acting to protect minor females 
to exclude them from punishment. Moreover, the risk of 
pregnancy itself constitutes a substantial deterrence to young 
females. No similar natural sanctions deter males. A crimi-
nal sanction imposed solely on males thus serves to roughly 
"equalize" the deterrents on the sexes. 
We are unable to accept petitioner's contention that the 
statute is impermissibly underinclusive and must, in order to 
pass judicial scrutiny, be broadened so as to hold the female 
as criminally liable as the male. The argument is that this 
statute is not necessary to deter teenage pregnancy because a 
gender-neutual statute, where both male and fema1e would be 
subject to prosecution, would also discourage sexual inter-
course by young females. The relevant inquiry, however, 
is not whether the statute is drawn as precisely as it m:ght 
have been, but whether the line chosen by the California 
Legislature is within constitutional limitations. Kahn v. 
Shevin, 416 U. S., at 356, n. 10. Here, the State persuasively 
- l 
contends that a gender-neutral statute would frustrate, rather 
than further, the purposes of the statute. The State's view 
is that a female is surely less likely to report violations of the 
statute if she herself would be subject to criminal prosecution. 
consequences" because "minors often lack the experience, per,;pective, and 
judgment to recognize and av01d choices that could be detrimental to 
them." Teenage sexual intercourse, and the concommitant problems of 
preguancy and abortion, involve ,;uch ' 'important affirmative choices with 
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1n an area already fraught with prosecutorial difficulties, we 
decline to hold that the Equal Protection Clause requires a 
legislature to enact a statute so broad that it may well be 
incapable of enforcement.9 
We similarly reject petitioner's argument that § 261.5 is 
impermissibly overbroad because it makes unlawful sexual 
intercourse with prepubescent females, who are, by definition, 
incapable of becoming pr-egnant. Quite apart from the fact 
that the statute could well be justified on the grounds that 
very young females are particularly susceptible to physical 
injury from sexual intercourse, see Rundlett v. Oliver, 607 
F . 2d 495 (CAI 1979), it is ludicrous to suggest that the 
Constitution requires the California Legislature to limit the 
scope of its rape statute to older teenagers and exclude young 
girls. 
There remains only petitioner's contention that the statute 
is unconstitutional as it is applied to him because he, like 
Sharon, was under 18 at the time of sexual intercourse. 
Petitioner argues that the statute is flawed because it pre-
sumes that as between two persons under 18, the male is the 
culpable aggressor. We find petitioner's contentions unper-
suasive. Contrary to his assertions, the statute does not rest on 
the assumption that males are generally the aggressors. It is 
instead an attempt by a · legislature to prevent illegitimate 
teenage pregnancy by providing an additional deterrent for 
men. The age of the man is irrelevant since young men are 
as capable as older men of inflicting the harm sought to be 
prevented. 
In upholding the California statute we also recognize that 
9 Petitioner contends that a gender-neutral statute would not hinder 
prosecutions b3cause the prosecutor could take into account the relative 
burdens on females and male;; and generally only prosecute male8. But 
to concede this is to concede all. If the prosecutDr, in exercising discre-
tion, will virtually always prosecute just the man and not the woman, 
we do not see why it is impermissible for the legislature to enact a st<1-tute 
to the same eff eot. 
- • 
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this is not a case where a statute is being challenged on the 
grounds that it "invidiously discriminates" against females. 
To the contrary, the statute- places a burden on males which is 
not shared by females. But we find nothing to suggest that 
men, because of past discrimination or peculiar disadvantages, 
are in need of the special solicitude of the courts. · Nor is this 
a case where the gender classification is made "solely . . . for 
administrative convenience," as in Frontiero v. Richardson, 
. 411 U. S. 677, 690 (1970) or rests on "the baggage of sexual 
sterotypes" as in Orr v. Orr, 440 U. S. 268; 283 (1979) . As 
we have held, the statute instead reasonably reflects the fact 
that the consequences of sexual intercourse and pregnancy 
fall more heavily on the female than on the male. 









To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Greg Morgan 
• 
Re: No. 79-1344: Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court 
Although Justice Rehnquist's opinion reaches the 
result you favor, and largely by the rationale you favor, I 
note below a few reservations which you might consider. 
(1) The opinion's statement of general principles. 
Justice Rehnquist rehearses the "law" of gender-based 
classifications at pages 3-4. In the full paragraph on page 3, 
as in Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, Justice Rehnquist 
avoids holding that the objective offerred to justify a gender-
based statute must be the objective, or a primary objective, 
actually considered by the Legislature. However, Justice 
V 
Rehnquist essentially uses the standard of Craig v. Boren, and 
he does not endorse expressly an "any-conceivable-basis" test. 
Furthermore, Craig itself did not decide the question whether 
the objective offerred must be the objective the legislature 
considered in passing the gender-based classification (429 U.S. 
at 199 n.7). I therefore do not think that this part of the 
opinion need trouble you. However, more on this below. 
I find one sentence which is more troubling in the 
next paragraph, which begins at the bottom of page 3 
("Because ••. ") and runs onto page 4. Justice Rehnquist cites 
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treat men and women differently "so long as" the classification 
is not "entirely unrelated to any differences between men and 
women .••. " Parham does not use that phrase ("entirely 
unrelated to any differences") to define the outer limit of a 
state legislature's power to adopt gender-based 
classifications. Rather, Parham uses that phrase to describe a 
gender-based classification which a state legislature cannot r 
pass. I therefore think that Justice Rehnquist has distorted ~ 
the quotation by taking it out of context. ~~ 
~~} ,. ( 2) The opinion's statements about discerning 
legislative purpose. 
Beginning with the first full paragraph on page 4, 
Justice Rehnquist discusses the difficulty of discerning the 
actual purpose behind legislation. He cites U.S. v. O'Brien, 
Palmer v. Thompson, and Arlington Heights. Justice Rehnquist 
cites these cases again, to the same effect, in note 7. These 
cases say what JusticeRehnquist cites them to say. But as you -
know, these cases, and the statements in them about discerning --1 e g isl at iv e purpose, are not addressed to the question whether 
the Court should require a statutory classification to be -----related to the "actual" legislative purpose legislative 
purpose. Rather, these cases are about the elements of proof 
in a discrimination purpose, and they are sucessive steps 
toward the Court's decision that one must prove discriminatory 





Thus, I again think that Justice Rehnquist has quoted out of 
context. 
3. 
To be sure, Justice Rehnquist could reply that 
statements in one context about discerning legislative purpose 
are true in another context as well. But the statement that 
legislative intent is difficult to discern is not an answer to 
the question whether the Court should insist that gender-based 
classifications be based only on the actual legislative 
purpose. Indeed, one could argue that the difficulty of 
discerning purpose is one reason for insisting upon a clear 
legislative statement of purpose. 
The bottom line is this: It seems clear to me that 
Justice Rehnquist cited these cases and statements for two 
reasons. One, he wished to get around the uncertainty in this 
case about the legislative purpose behind the statutory-rape 
law. Two, he wished to suggest, or to lay a foundation for 
holding, that gender-based classifications may be upheld on a 
showing of any conceivable basis. It also seems clear to me 
that these citations are unnecessary to the opinion. The -----------------~--------
opinion could proceed directly from the end of the first 
sentence of the full paragraph on page 4 ("Applying ..• 
conduct.") to the beginning of page 5 ("The justification 
•.• • "). The opinion would not lose any reasoning or 
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Other than having these reservations, I think that 
Justice Rehnquist resolves this case as you believe it should 
be resolved. The crux of his opinion is that men and women are 
not similarly situated with regard to the risks and dangers of 
pregnancy. That being so, the state can impose a deterrent at 
only one of the two, and the State acts reasonably when it 
imposes the deterrent on men because men have no "natural" 
deterrent. Justice Rehnquist then dispels the arguments that 
the classification is "underinclusive" and "overinclusive," and 
finally he rejects the argument that the statute is 
unconstitutional as applied to a minor such as Michael M. 
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December 11, 1980 
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Court. It is quite possible t hat I s hall 
file a concurring opinion. If so, it will be 
circulated sometime in the n e xt few days. 
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Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
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cc: The Conference 
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.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN December 1 7, 1980 
Re: No . 79-1344 - Michael M. v. Superior Cour t 
Dear Bil l: 
J 
I have read your proposed opinion with great care . It is 
a matter of regret for me tha t I am unable to join it in its 
presen t form . For now , I shall awai t the dissent. Whethe r I 
shall write separately , concurring in the judgment, or merely 
concur in the result , or even join the dissent, wil l depend on 
what else is forthcoming . 
My problems center in : (l) a concer n that the opinion does 
not follow the analysis of Craig v. Boren , bu t has substituted 
a lowe r level of scrutiny (Craig itself also involved a statute 
that burdened males disproportionately to females ); (2) peti-
tion er ' s companion 's eage r part ic ipat ion , at least initially, 
in the intimacies of June 3, 1978 ; (3) a concer n abou t the 
validity of the opinion ' s reliance on hfa~hi_Q_9_ton v. Da vis , 
_Palm~ v. 1:_homoson, and Arlington Height§_ , al l racia l cases , 
in the presen t context ; ( 4 ) concer n with footnote 8, particu-
larly its reliance on Lewis ' stateme nt in Bellott i v. Baird 
whic h I did no t join ( incidentally , the volume citation is in 
error ) ( I also th ink that the extent to which the States c a n 
legislat e in this are a is still a n ope n question, wh ich prompts 
me to conclude that footnote 8 is unnecessary ) ; · and ( 5 ) a 
feel i ng that the opinion is 3cnewhat a t odds wit h my steadfas t 
positions on abort i o n and privacy rights , and with what I 
though t was the Court ' s acknow l edged c omm itme nt to privac y 
rights . 
I s~y aga in tha t I regret Lo give you lhis tesponse . I -n 
fully ... 0 ware of the fact , c.rnd a n so,ae,,ha t burdened by it, lhat 
i71Y vote may wel l be the controlling one fo r ti1is case. I 1lc.d 
though t that the Ca lifornia slatute was s11slainable and , be-
cz.1.1se I did , I vote d to affirm . l\s of now , I am st ill of tha t 
vi _w , hut for the rcasoris statt,a .::cov e could no t join yo•ir 
opi:1 : on . I shal l see Khat l:' e cl issL. 1 t l1,1s to c.ay and thc.n 
shal l come dow n one way o r the olher . 
Mr . Justice Rehnqu i s t 
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Please join me. 
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~~ 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
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SUPBEME ·ootmT OF THE UNITED BTATIS 
No. 79-1344 
v. On Writ of Certiorari to 
Michael M., Petitioner, I 
Superior Court of Sonoma County the Supreme Court of 
(California, Real Party in California. 
Interest). 
[February -, 1981] 
JusTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in the judgment. 
It is gratifying that the plurality recognizes that "[a]t the 
risk of stating the obvious, teenage pregnancies . .. have in-
creased dramatically over the last two decades" and "have 
significant social, medical and economic consequences for both 
the mother and her child, and the State." Ante, at 5. There -have been times when I have wondered whether the Court 
was capahle "21Ti'is pmepfion, particutarly when it has strug-
glecr" witlithe diherent '6ut not uprelated problems that attend 
abortion issues. See, for example, thP, opinions (and the dis-
senting opinions) in Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S. 438 (1977); 
Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464 ( 1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432 
432 U.S. 519 (1977); Harris v. McRae, - V. S. - (1980); 
Williams v. Zbaraz, - V . S. - (1980); and today's opin-
ion in H. L . v. Matheson, ante. 
Some might conclude that the two uses of the criminal 
sanction-here flatly to forbid intercourse in order to fore-
stall teenage pregnancies, and in Matheson to prohibit a 
physician's abortion procedure except upon notice to the 
parents of the pregnant minor-are vastly different proscrip-
tions. But the basic social and privacy problems are much 
the same. Both Utah's statute in Matheson and California's 
statute in this case are legislatively-created tools intended to 
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cerns: the control and direction of young people's sexual ac-
tivities. The plurality opinion impliedly concedes as much 
when it notes that "approximately half of all teenage preg-
nancies end in abortion," and that "those children who are 
born" are "likely candidates to become wards of the State," 
Ante, at 5-6, and n. 6. 
I, however, cannot vote to strike down the California stat-
utory rape law, for I think it is a sufficiently reasoned and 
constitutional effort to control the problem at its inception. 
For me, there is an important difference between this state 
action and a State's adamant and rigid refusal to face, or even 
to recognize, the "significant . . . consequences"-to the 
woman-of a forced or unwanted conception. I have found 
it difficult to rule constitutiopal, for example, state efforts to 
block, at that later point, a woman's attempt to deal with 
the enormity of the problem confronting her, just as I have 
rejected state efforts to prevent women from rationally tak-
ing steps to prevent that problem from arising. See, e. g., 
Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678 
(1977). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 
(1965). In contrast, I am persuaded that, although a minor 
has substantial privacy rights in intimate affairs connected 
with procreation, California's efforts to prevent teenage preg-
nancy are to be viewed differently from Utah's efforts to in-
hibit a woman from dealing with pregnancy once it has 
become an inevitability. 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), was an opinion which, 
in large part, I joined, id. , at 214. 'The plurality opinion in 
the present case points out, ante, at 3, the Court's respective 
phrasings of the applicable test in Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 
71, 76 (1971), and in Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. , at 197. I 
vote to affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia and to uphold the State's gender-based classification 
on that test and as exemplified by those two cases and by 
Schles'inger v. Bailard, -419 U.S. 498 (1975); Weinberget v. 
- -
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Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636 (1975); and Kahn v. Shevin, 416 
u. s. 351 (1974). 
I note, also, that § 261.5 of the California Penal Code is 
just one of several California statutes intended to protect 
the juvenile. JusTICE STEWART, in his concurring opinion, 
appropriately observes that § 261.5 is "but one part of a 
broad statutory scheme that protects all minors from the· 
problems and risks attendant upon adolescent sexual activ-
ity." Ante, at 2. 
I think, too, that it is only fair, with respect to this partic-
ular petitioner, to point out that his partner, Sharon, appears 
not to have been an unwilling participant in at least the 
initial stages of the intimacies that took place the night of 
June 3, 1978.* Petitioner's and Sharon's nonacquaintance 
\ *Sharon at the preliminar~· hearing test.ified as follows: 
"Q [by the Deputy District. Attorney]. On June the 4tn, at approxi-
mately midnight,.....cmidnight of June the 3rd, were you in ·Rohnert Park? 
"A [by Sharon]. Yes. 
"Q. Is that in Sonoma County? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Did anything unusual ha.ppen to you that night in Rohnert Park?' 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Would you briefly describe what happened that night? Did you 
see the defendant that night in Rohnert Park? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Wbere did you first meet him? 
"A. At a bus stop. 
·«Q. Was anyone with you? 
"A. My sister. 
"Q. Was anyone with the defendant? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. How many people were with the defendant? 
"A. Two. 
"Q. Now, after you met the defendant, what happened? 
"A. We walked down to the railroad track5. 
"Q. What ·happened at the railroad tracks? 
"A. We were drinking at the railroad tracks and we walked over to this 
bush and he started kissing me and stuff, and I was kissing him back, too, 
at first, ·Then,] was telling him to stop-
- -
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with each other before the . incident: their drinking; their 
withdrawal from the others of the group; their foreplay, in 
which she willingly participated arid seems to have encour-
"Q. Yes. 
"A. -and I was telling him to slow down and stop. He said, 'Okay, 
okay.' But then he .just kept ·doing it. He just· kept doing it and then 
my sister and two other ·guys came over to where we were and my sister-
said-told me to get up 'and come home. And then -1 didn't-
"Q. Yes. 
"A. -and then my sister and-
"Q. All right. 
"A. -David, one of the boys that -were there, st1uted walking home 
and we stayed there and then later-
"Q. All right. 
"A. -Bruce left Michael, you know. 
"The Court: Michael being the defendant? 
"The Witness: Yeah. We was laying there and we were kissing each 
other, and then he asked me if I wanted to walk him over to t he park; so 
we walked over to the park and we sat down on a bench and then he 
started kissing me again and we were laying on the bench. And he told 
me to take my pants off. 
"I sa id , 'No,' and I was trying to get up and he hit me back down on 
the bench and then I just said to myself, 'Forget it;' and I let him do what 
he wanted to do and he took my pants off and he was telling me to put 
my legs around him and stuff-
' . 
"Q. Did you have sexual intercourse with the defendant? 
"A. Yeah. 
"Q. He did put his penis into your vagina? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. You said that he hit you? 
"A. Yeah. 
" Q. How did he hit you? 
"A. He slugged me in the face. 
"Q. With what did he slug you? 
"A. His fist. 
"Q. Where abouts in the face? 
"A. On my chin. 
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aged; and the closeness of their ages ( a difference of only one 
year and 18 days) are factors that should make this case an I 
unattractive one to prosecute at all , and especially to pros-
"Q. What happened? 
"A. I had bruises. 
"The Court : Did he hit -you one . time or did he hit you more tha_n 
once? 
"The Witness: He hit me about two or three times. . . 
''Q. Now, during the course of that evening, did the defendant ask 
·you your age?' 
"A. Yeah. 
''Q. And what dld you tell him? 
''A. Sixteen. 
"Q. Did you tell him you were sixteen? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Now, you said you had been drinking, is that correct? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Would you describe your condition as a. result of the drinking? 
"A. I was a little drni1k." App. ' 20-23. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
"Q. Did you go off with Mr. M. away from the others? 
"A. Yeah. 
"Q. Why did you do that? 
"A. I don't know. I 6'1.less I wanted to. 
"Q. Did you have any need to go to the bathroom when you were there, 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And what did you do? 
"A. Me and my sister walked down the railroad tracks to some bushes 
and went to the ba.throom. 
"Q. Now, you and Mr. M., as I under&tand it, went off into the bushes, 
is that correct? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Okay. And what did you do when you and Mr. M. were there· 
in the bushes? 
"A. We were kissing and hugging. 
"Q. Were you sitting up? 
"A. We were laying down. 
"Q. You were lying down. This was in the bushes? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. '.How far away from the rest of them were · you! 
I - -
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ecute as a felony, rather than as a misdemeanor chargeable 
under § 261.5. But the State has chosen to prosecute in that J 
"A. They were just bushes right next the railroad tracks. We just 
walked off into the bushes; not very far. 
"Q. So your sister and the other two boys came over to where you were, 
you and Michael were, is that right? 
"A. Yeah. 
"Q. What did they say to you, if you remember'? 
"A. My sister didn't say anything. She said, 'Come on, Sharon, let's 
go home.' 
"Q. She asked you to go home with her? 
"A. (Affirmative nod.) 
''Q. Did you go home with her? 
"A. No. 
"Q. You wanted to stay with Mr. M.? 
"A. I don't know. 
"Q. Was this before or after he hit you? 
"A. Before. 
"Q. What happened in the five minutes that Bruce stayed there with 
you and Michael? 
"A. I don't remember. 
"Q. You don't remember at all? 
"A. (Negative head shake.) 
"Q. Did you have occasion at that time to kiss Bruce? 
"A. Yeah. 
"Q. You did? You were kissing Bruce at that time? 
"A. (Affirmative nod.) 
"Q. Was Bruce kissing you? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And were you standing up at this time? 
"A. No, we were sitting down. 
"Q. Okay. So at this point in time you had left Mr. M . and you 
were hugging and ·kissing with Bruce, is that right? 
"A. Yeah. 
"Q. And you were sitting up. 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Was your sister still there then? 
"A .. No. Yeah, she· was at firs1. 
• ► - -
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manner, and the facts, I reluctantly conclude, may fit the 
cnme. 
"Q. What was she doing? 
"A. She was standing up with Michael and David. 
"Q. Ye,3. Was she doing anything with Michael and David"? 
"A. No, I don't think so. 
"Q. Whose idea was it for you and Bruce to kiss? Did you initiate 
that"? 
"A. Yes . 
"Q. What happened after Bruce left? 
l'A. Michael asked me if I wanted to go walk to the park. 
"Q. And what did you say·? 
"A. I said, "·Ye:s." 
"Q. And then what happened? 
" A. We walked to the park. 
"Q. How long did it take you to get to the park? 
"A. About ten or fifteen minutes. 
"Q. And did you walk there ? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Did Mr. M. ever mention his name ? 
"A. Yes ." Id., at 27-32. 
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